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Abstract. The following document, presents and analyzes the Risks Analysis 
in the whole software development life cycle, framed like one of the 
recommended practices for secure software development.  It present and 
compare a set of Risk Analysis methodologies and strategies, considering like 
criteria some classifications propose by different authors and the objectives 
that they persecute to orient them towards of evaluation criterion for the secure 
software development. 
1 Introduction 
When a new software product is developed, assuring the incorporation of all 
functionalities required by the users to the new system is not enough, a set of quality 
characteristics exists which must consider it at software designing and implementing 
time. On these quality characteristics, exist diverse models and standards developed, 
under which different quality attributes are considered, they can vary of model in 
model.  Between these attributes, they are possible to be mentioned for example, 
software mantenibility, reusability, correction, integrity, efficiency and security, 
among others and vary according to the model.   
In relation to the security, the increasing technology incorporation in all  
organizational processes, has caused that this attribute acquires real relevance, that at 
present, multiple researches are made, like one carried out in the United States in 
2003 [1], where representatives of the industry, academy and the Government, met 
them for analyze the consequences of the vulnerabilities of the developed software 
products under the traditional development models, that models do not incorporate 
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adecuately the security like a necessary characteristic throughout the software 
development life cycle. This forum, in addition, has made a series of 
recommendations to follow with the purpose of improving the development 
processes in the software developer organizations.  
At the present time, several works and proposals about software development, 
indicate the importance of studying and investigating the products security.  For 
example, the process proposed by Software Engineering Institute of the University of 
Carnegie Mellon, Team Software Process, which has evolved to the TSP-Secure, or 
the CMM model, developed by the same Institution, that it has served as base for the 
development of CMM System Security Engineering.   
In general, the software security is limited by the work that develops the operators 
of the implemented systems to protect the vulnerabilities identified in the 
organization, having a great infrastructure mounted and handled by people who 
determine and raise the security policies;  but software that they protect, has been 
designed with the security that deserves?,  From the beginning of their construction, 
has been considered the different properties from security and they have been 
developed throughout its implementation?   
This article deals with the Security focused on development process, being 
centered in a revision of the practice of the Risks Analysis from different aspects.  In 
the first place techniques and approaches are described taking like main reference the 
McGraw proposal for secure software development (section 2).  The McGraw’s 
proposal shown in fig 1, introduces best practices of security and involves a 
interdisciplinary atmosphere to apply them and to develop them, with the purpose of 
fighting against the problems which it is exposed software, specifically about 
connectivity, extensibilidad and complexity [2].  
Later (section 3), appear different risks management methodologies.  And finally, 
a comparative of risks analysis tools is made, which raises certain practices like 
security tests application, threats models use, attacks patterns and risks analysis 
(section 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Software development life cycle  - McGraw’s proposal 
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Between the diverse concepts that exist of quality, it has been taken like reference 
that is mentioned in [3]. That one reference to that the quality is given by the client 
requirements, it is to say that "the quality exists in a product when it is apt for the use 
that the clients that buy it give him." Considering this definition of quality, it is 
important to focus the Risks Analysis like a support element to identify those 
problems that affect a software development project.   
In the software development processes models Spiral, considered like a realistic 
approach for great scale systems, the Risks Analysis is also proposed throughout the 
software development life cycle [4]. This Paradigm uses an evolutionary approach, 
allowing to the developer and the client to understand and to react to the risks in each 
level.  It uses the creation of prototypes like a risk reduction gear1. The Spiral Model 
recommends the iterative Risks Analysis within the phases of the software 
development life cycle, defining explicitly the stages in which it must be made, 
which agree with the McGraw’s model [2]; where it recommends the 
accomplishment of the Risks Analysis of high level in the early phases and its 
iterative application throughout the service software development life cycle, 
specially in the Testing stage [5].    
McGraw in [6], raises the security is due to incorporate throughout the software 
development cycle whole, with the purpose of include characteristic emergent like:  
to specify what must be protected, who must to be in charge and by how long must 
become that protection.  
The security is always related to the information and the services that must be 
protected, therefore it has relation with the intruders skill, who attack the system.  
The risk analysis, specially in the design level, allows to identify the main security 
problems and their impact [7], once identified and classified allows to establish the 
guide of software security tests.   
The attack models are a very useful tool for the identification of the risks that can 
affect a new software product.  The classification and identification of the attacks 
models that Whittaker proposes [8] and the risks taxonomy propose by Wang and 
Wang in [9] gives facilities to do the risks identification task by means of possible 
attacks to the system.   
Some studies made2 sustain the importance that it has to specially do an risks 
analysis in early stages of the software development. In addition, Microsoft informs 
that more than 50% of the software security problems they are in design defects, 
nevertheless, the work for measure the software security and the risks are important 
throughout the software development life cycle [6]. 
As it is observed in fig 1, and like it has considered in the preceding paragraphs, it 
recommended to do the Risk Analysis in the Requirements, Design and Tests stages.  
In the following sections, some approaches for each one of these stages are 
described. 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 http://www.itlp.edu.mx/publica/tutoriales/analisis/index.html 
2
 www.cio.com/archive/021502/security.html 
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2.1 Risk Análisis in Requirement level 
 
Next three strategies considered in [5] are enunciated , they describe the risks 
analysis process in the Requirements phase:   
1. SecureUML:  It is a methodology for access control policies modeled and for the 
handling of the integration model in the software development.  SecureUML is 
located in the access control and the security requirements models for applications 
in predictable atmospheres.   
2. UMLsec:  It is an extension of UML that allows the security characteristics 
modeled related to confidentiality and access control3.   
3. Abuse Cases Model:  Proposed by Sindre and Opdahl as a way to understand the 
form in which it would be possible to be responded to the applications threats in 
less controlable surroundings; they describe the functions that the system does not 
have to admit. 
 
2.2 Risk Análysis in Design level 
 
In the Design level, the risk analysis must fulfill characteristics like the indicated 
in [6]:  a consequent system vision, the high level of system knowledge and the 
consideration of the typical vision of analysts and developer when they belive in the 
sufficiency to describe and to discover the design problems in the code level. In 
adition, it is also necessary to consider the business risk analysis and the 
architectonic risk analysis:   
1. Business Risk Analysis: The companies wants answers as opposed to the 
investment and to the cost.  Therefore, to appraise the impact is a primary target at 
the moment for do the risk analysis, considering that a good strategy considers 
questions of cost of the project, so that the direction of the organization can decide 
the investment in software in relation to the direct cost (responsibility, wasted 
productivity and reelaboration) as indirect cost (reputation and damage of mark) 
[10].   
2. Architectonic Risk Analysis:  Similar to the previous one, this analysis measures 
the technical security exposition in the proposed design of an application and it 
connects them with the impact of the company.  Beginning with a representation 
of high level of the design, the analysis team considers each one of the modules, 
interface, interaction, etc. against the well-known attack methodologies and their 
success probability.  In order to provide a general visualization of the security 
state of a software system, the analysts apply the analysis against the individual 
design subcomponents [10].   
 
 
2.3. Risk Analysis in the Testing level. 
 
The risks evaluation in the Testing phase, it allows to evaluate the system against 
the different risks that affect the product quality.  The Risk Analysis in this stage 
 
3
 www4.in.tum.de/umlsec/ 
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allows the project team to arrange and to compare the quality risks with the other 
categories risks.  Categories as like they are defined in [3]: 
a) Financial risks:  It affects the project budget. 
b) Schedule Risks: They affect the time assigned to project  
c) Feature Risks: They affect the product characteristics, generally their 
development obtained a mistaken result.  
d) Quality Risks:  They affect the relation client - satisfaction.   
This analysis assures the evaluation of product quality risks and the failures 
identification in different attributes from quality, not only in the software 
functionality.  The Risk Analysis also will have to be do having in account other 
characteristics, like the Rex Black’s recommendation in [3].  The same author 
proposes the accomplishment of Risk Analysis under three techniques:   
1. Informal technique:  It works well without considering the development process 
maturity.  The author proposes the use of a table with three columns where the 
Risks, the error mode associated to the risk will be enunciated and finally a 
column of Priority, determining evaluation ranks. For the risks idenficación, the 
errors and specially the priority; the author raises a meeting with a team of project 
key people.   
2. Standard ISO 9126 Approach: This standard proposes that the software system 
quality can be measured throughout six very important characteristics:   
Functionality:  System Capacity requeridad  
Reliability:  The system works when it is needed and how it is needed. 
Usability: The System can be to use like instinctive, comprehensible and useful 
for the users.   
Efficiency:  Resources use.  
Mantenibility:  System update facility.   
Performance:  System answer capacity.   
Like in the Informal Technique, the Risk Analysis process, is developed defining 
quality sub-characteristics also identified in the standard - within which is the 
security – and the priority levels related to the test of each area are determined for 
the project stakeholders.   
3. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA):  It is a tool that reviews the 
potential product or the process failures, it values the risk priorities4.  This tool 
appears in spreadsheet format and it admits a easy analysis evaluation.  The use of 
this method is advisable specially on development projects very structured, with 
the purpose of formalizing the of quality risk analysis process. An example of 
application of this tool is described in [3]. 
   The key of an Risk analysis that supports the software development process in 
iterative form, from early stages like design, to final stages like Testing; it is the 
accomplishment of a good analysis, using tools and methodologies able to bring to 
light software problems that with the tests or a delayed Risk analysis would not be 
identified or would be correct easily and consequently it obtain a unsecure software 
development. 
 
 
4
 http://web2.concordia.ca/Quality/tools/11failuremodeanalisys.pdf 
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3 Risks Management Methodologies 
 
In order to be able to develop a secure software product, able to proactively 
resitir the attacks which is exposed, it is essential to consider the risks throughout the 
development cycle. With this objective, different strategies and frameworks have 
been proposed, they harnesses the risks identification, allowing managing them, that 
is to say, to plan, to implement and to control the measures against the risks and 
vulnerabilities founded. 
 
3.1. Risks Management Proposals 
 
Next, some strategies propose appear to develop the risks management. They 
have been selected by the endorsement and recognition that have the organizations 
who have developed them. 
 
Risk Management Framework (RMF): This proposal has been elaborated by 
Cigital, where the business goals determine the risks, the risks lead the methods, the 
methods measure the yield, the measures handle the decisions support and the 
decisions support handles the reajuste/reelaboration and the aplicationn quality [6]. 
The RMF intention is to assume a capable, consequent and repetible approach for the 
risks prevention. The Cigital’s proposal describes in [11] like a iterative process, it 
trim in five basic activity stages, concentrated in following the trajectory, visualizing 
and to understand the process with respect to the software risk.  This structure has 
been applied in the software field during almost 10 years [11] and the design that 
presents allows to discover the company risks, including those of software.  RMF 
consists of five fundamental stages: 
1. Understand the Business Context: The business objectives and risks are 
identified.  The analyst will have to extract and to describe the objectives of the 
company, the priorities and circumstances to understand the software risks 
perfectly [11]. 
2. Identify and link the Business and Technical Risks: It must identify business 
risks.  Aid to define and to direct the use of technical methods to extract, to 
measure and to mitigate the software risk. On the other hand, the technical risks, 
involve impacts like unexpected system faults, failures in the software controls, 
data modification.  This stage is understood like one of the best practices of Fig 1. 
3. Synthesize and Rank the Risks: Within the two previous stages, it will find 
many evident risks, nevertheless the sintetización and priorización of these will 
have to serve to give value to the analysis process that is tried to make. 
4. Define the Risks Mitigation Strategy:  This strategy will be defined under the 
business context.  It must identify the validation techniques that are going to be 
used to mitigate appropriately the risks.   
5. Carry out Fixes and Validate: When a strategy is defined (step 4) it must be 
executed. When identifying a problem it must be rectified, following the defined 
strategy. This process must be measured in relation to the risk mitigación strategy. 
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Finally the Cigital’s proposal raises an additional activity but not less important, 
to inform and to report. 
 
Framework for Managing Information Security Risk: Software Engineering 
Institute (SEI) of the University of Carnegie Melon, has developed the evaluation 
strategy OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability 
Evaluation), whose objective is to measure the organizacional risk and it focuses in 
strategic and practical aspects.  Aid to an organization to take decisions on the basis 
of the risks from confidentiality, integrity and availability of the critical assets 
associated to the information that has its [12]. In this context, the SEI also proposes a 
Risks Managing Framework [13] it is a risks identification process and its address. 
Next, they briefly describe each one of the stages that conforms the cyclical process: 
1. Identify:  The objective of this stage is to anticipate the risks, before problems 
appear. As result it obtains a set of documented risks, including critical assets, 
threats and vulnerabilities.   
2. Analyze:  This point is the of specific risk analysis. The obtained result is the 
impact and probability of occurrence of each identified risk and a mitigación 
approach of such risks.   
3. Plan: The actions are determined to develop to improve the organization security 
and the critical assets protection. As result is obtained: protection strategy; risks 
mitigation plan; action plans, budget, success criteria, indicators for to monitor the 
fulfillment of the action plans and the allocations of responsibility for the 
implementation of these plans.   
4.  Implement:  Its objective is to execute the defined action plans.   
5. Monitor:  It is the track process of the action plans to determine its fulfillment.  
Some results of this stage are: Completed actions, progress reports, indicators risk.   
6. Control:  In this stage it determines if the personnel adjusts to the defined action 
plans, and if the organizacionales changes have caused new risks. As result new 
decisions can be obtained on changes in the plans or due to the new risks 
identification. 
 
Magerit: Information Systems Risks Analysis and Management Methodology.  The 
reason of being of Magerit is directly related to the generalization of the use of the 
electronic, computer science and telematics means, it supposes evident benefits;  but 
also it gives rise to certain risks that must be diminished with security measures 
which they generate confidence. Magerit allows to know the risk that the work 
elements are put under, being considered an essential procedure5. This methodology 
proposes a methodical approach that allows to make decisions with foundation and 
to rationally explain the taken decisions. The risk determination  is made by means 
of six steps defined methodically in [14], they are:   
1.  To determine the eminent assets for the organization.   
2. To value such assets based on the cost that would suppose for the organization to 
recover it of a failure of availability, integrity, confidentiality or authenticity. 
3. To determine to what threats are exposed those assets.   
4. To value the vulnerability of the assets to the potential threats.   
 
5
 http://www.csi.map.es/csi/pg5m20.htm 
34              José Carrillo Verdún1, Gloria Gasca Hurtado1, Edmundo Tovar Caro1 and Vianca 
Vega Zepeda2 
 
5. To consider the impact, defined as the damage on the assets derived from the 
materialization of the threat.   
6. To consider the risk, defined as the impact weighed with the rate of occurrence of 
the threat. 
 
Integrated approach for risks mitigation: The Institute of Technology of 
Californian Jet Laboratory Propulsion along with the University of Californian At 
Davis, has developed an integrated approach for security risks mitigation [15], it 
form of the following components:   
a) Vulnerability Matrix (Vmatrix):  It is a data base that contains catalogued 
vulnerabilities taxonomy and that can be acceded like library.   
b) Security Assessment Tools (SAT): It is a tools list available, where the intention 
of each one is included.   
c) Properties-based Testing: It tries to cover the existing emptiness between the 
formal verification and the ad-hoc verification.   
d) Model-Based Security Specification and Verification: It is used to verify if they 
are fulfilled the wished security properties.   
The authors indicate that although, each component can be applied in independent 
form, when applying them altogether, it obtain benefits like the developing system 
trustworthiness is increase. 
 
3.2. Proposals Analysis 
 
 The strategies presented in the previous section, they are coincident in several 
points.  Perhaps one of most important is the implicit recognition that it is impossible 
that the 100% of the detected risks they are eliminated, thus is necessary and 
imprecindible the risks priorización based on the damage that can cause, of such way 
to invest greater resources in those than can cause greater losses to the organization. 
Others of the agreement points are given by the iterative approach of the proposals, 
reaffirming of this form the fact that the risks and threats can be varying through the 
time, thus, it due to do constants revisions and adjustments to the new organizations 
reality. The three first proposals are oriented to give processes to follow to manage 
the risks, however, the last integrated approach proposal, is but well a tools set that 
facilitates this work. 
4 Risk Analysis Tools 
Next, it briefly describe a tools set for the risk analysis development, which in 
the following section will be put under a classification and comparison on the basis 
of the criteria explained down.  The tools selection has been do having in account the 
prestige and experience of the organizations who have developed them or who 
suggest them as successful tools for the risk analysis. 
 
The risks analysis like a practice of secure software development.  A revision of 
models and methodologies
35
 
Microsoft’s STRIDE: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, 
Denial of service and Elevation of privilege6, it is a commercial tool, developed to 
support the threats identification in the software development.  Keith Brown, in their 
book “The .NET Developer's Guide to Windows Security”7, enunciates the 
importance of the threats modeled when software is development and designs and he 
raises as guideline for his modeled the use of this tool.  As well, Kenneth van Wyk8 
raises the accomplishment of risks analysis to prevent threats in the software 
development and he relates the utility of this tool like support to the work, effort and 
time that a good risks analysis requires.   
Sun’s ACSM/SAR: It was created to evaluate of formal way the software 
development and to determine its security level.  Mark G. Graff and Kenneth R. van 
Wyk9 study the code maintenance within software development because they 
consider it vital for the security and they propose methodologies and practices for the 
security software development from the point of view of evaluations for this 
analysis.  For that reason its proposal enunciates tool ACSM/SAR and ASSET like 
good elements for the developer. 
ASSET: Automated Security Self-Evaluation Tool is the automated version of 
questionnaire "Security Self-Assessment Guide for Information Technology 
Systems", created by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). This 
questionnaire looks for to help in the systems security evaluation that has an 
organization.  ASSET is forms of two tools: ASSET-System, this one is the interface 
that allows to respond the questionnaire; and ASSET-Manager which orders and 
summarizes the questionnaire application results. 
Siemerns CRAMM: Risks Valuation Tool.  It includes in addition, other tools that 
approach tasks like:  to identify the impact of the risk valuation in the company, to 
measure the threats and the vulnerabilities, to identify risks and justifying the 
required controls, based in the risk valuation.  Within the advantages of this tool, the 
developers argue10 that it has an excellent capacity to determine requirements for 
specific controls like:  Authentication Level, Encriptation and Hardware Protection, 
to identify security functional requirements required by the new application, to 
develop security requirements, evaluation of a security atmosphere, among others. 
Cigital's SQM Solutions: Cigital Software Quality Management, was created under 
the motto "To identify and to eliminate software security defects during the software 
development and it test" the product Cigital SQM tries to offer a new series of 
solutions and services for software quality developed around innovating products.  In 
addition, this tool combines the risks prevention, software measurement and software 
process improvement to help the companies to lead the cost of the quality software 
development.11 
SecureUML: It is done on the UML base (Unified Modeling Language).  This tool 
considers the advantages to integrate security engineering in the software 
 
6
 http://books.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/11/21/1442228 
7
 http://pluralsight.com/wiki/default.aspx/Keith.GuideBook/What%20Is%20A%20Security%20Principal.html 
8
 http://www.esecurityplanet.com/views/article.php/3417561 
9
 http://www.cedarlug.org/article.php?story=2004040617250150 
10
 http://www.insight.co.uk/files/datasheets/CRAMM%20(Datasheet).pdf 
11
 http://www.cigital.com/news/index.php?pg=art&artid=110 
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development life cycle, with the purpose of facilitating the mature security 
development beyond avoiding the infraction of the security policies..12 
UMLSec: Its objective is to raise an approach based on UML (Unified Modeling 
Language) it allows to express the information related to the security by means of 
diagrams in the system specification.  Therefore UMLsec is defined under the UML 
profile, in particular when associating the security restrictions of a software design, 
references to a formal semantics of a simplified UML fragment13.  
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA): It is a methodology to analyze and to 
discover all the potential system error ways, its effects and how to correct or to 
mitigate these failures. It is the analysis procedure more used in the initial stages of 
the systems development like Conceptual Design stage14, nevertheless there are 
authors like Rex Black that considers the possibility and utility of this tool to 
eliminate all the potential system failures, therefore they focus it in the Testing stage. 
It is a specific methodology to value the system, the design, the process, or the 
service in the different possible ways in that the failures (problems, errors, risks, 
consequences) can happen [16]. 
Pilar: The risks analysis and management methodology Magerit (section 3) in its 
second version15, is accompanied by the risks analysis and management tool PILAR, 
elaborated by the National Cryptoanalytic Center and the Spain Public 
Administrations Ministry; it allows to define the assets and threats of an information 
and communications system, with object to determine its safeguard that allow to 
reduce the risk to which is put under the system16.  PILAR constitutes a tools set that 
supports to the information system risks analysis and management, following the 
Magerit 1.0 methodology and that at the present time offers:   
a) Pilar-1: qualitative analysis, before entering a detailed quantitative analysis.   
b) Pilar-2: detailed quantitative analysis, with the purpose of obtaining results of the 
investment recovery in its safeguard, in terms of declining risk17. 
5. Risk Analysis Tools Comparative 
The following table shows a classification and comparison of the described tools.  
This classification uses some criteria proposed by McGraw (Column Type) and 
others defined by the authors of this article (Column Security). 
The criterion "Type" indicates the classification given by McGraw in [5]. In the 
comparative that appears it indicates the objective that looked for to reach at the time 
of its development:     
• Commercial:  Those methodologies done with an aim to commercialize it like 
support to certain task within the software development.     
 
12
 http://www.foundstone.com/resources/whitepapers/wp_secureuml.pdf 
13
 http://www4.in.tum.de/~juerjens/papers/uml02.pdf 
14
 http://www.nepss.org/presentations/dfr9.pdf 
15
 http://www.revistasic.com/revista64/propuestas_64.htm 
16
 http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2004/11/23/pdfs/A38750-38750.pdf 
17
 http://www.ccn.cni.es/medidas_tecnicas/herramientas.htm 
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• Standards: They are tools, standards or methodologies done by official institutions 
and proposals like standards of risk analysis.  
• Security:  It has been catalogued because they have been thought under the criteria 
of software security or secure software, is to say that the security aspects are the 
main objective to support within the development of the risk analysis.   
The criterion "Security", determined by the authors of this investigation, looks for 
to categorizar the methodologies and tools considering the support levels that can 
offer these methodologies in the security requirements analysis for the software 
development, from a low level at a high level, of the following form:   
**:   Low Level  
***:   Mean level  
****:  High Level  
*****: Very High Level 
 
Table 1. Risks Analysis Methodologies and Tools Classification. 
Tool or Metodology Type Security 
Microsoft’s STRIDE Comercial **** 
Sun’s ACSM/SAR Comercial *** 
ASSET Comercial - Standard *** 
Siemerns CRAMM Comercial *** 
Cigital's SQM Solutions Comercial-Security ***** 
SecureUML Comercial- Security **** 
UMLSec Comercial- Security **** 
Pilar Standard ** 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Security **** 
 
Of this form, the Low Level indicates that the mentioned methodology or tool 
allows to make an risk analysis, but that its philosophy has not been thought directly 
in analysis of software security aspects, whereas the Very High Level, it will occur 
to a tool that has been constructed or raised under the philosophy of the software 
security aspects, considering the difference between security software and safe 
software (critical). 
When the table is analyzing, it can be observed that most of the risks analysis 
tools were not developed for its exclusive application in the software security 
development, but well, they are of general use.  The approaches and strategies of 
security and risks evaluation in the organizations, have been focused like a necessity 
by the increasing incorporation of the information technology, although it is certain, 
the software products are part of this technology, at the time of making the risks 
analysis, would be due to incorporate particular considerations, as threats and typical 
attacks that frequently happen, and also the vulnerabilities generated by errors or 
negligences in the design and implementation of these products.   
The objective to describe the security aspects of the methodologies mentioned, is 
to focus future research works directed to support the Risk analysis like a good 
practice within the life cycle, framed in the proposal of figure 1. 
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6 Conclusions 
 
The importance of Risk Analysis in the early stages of the software development life 
cycle, like it has been showed previously; it extends from the product quality to the 
security and evolve to such an extent that wakes up the interest of the business in 
aspects like costs and investment return.   
In the security scope, if the requirements and necessities of an organization are 
not considered from the early stages of the software development life cycle and these 
are not evaluated in the other development stages, hardly it will be obtained a system 
robust, able to repulse the attacks so common in the present time.   
Every day the organizations take more serious the security problems, and this is 
demonstrated with the different initiatives taken to do that the software developers 
become aware from the importance of improving their processes, incorporating 
practical that they look for to reach the security product implementation, proactive to 
the attacks.  The necessity to incorporate the study and application of the security 
software life cycle under the standards parameters and associated quality models to 
good practices, with the purpose of having developments able to respond and to face 
the attacks and the systems attackers, it is complemented with the preoccupation of 
the industry, the academy and the commerce giving as result variety of efforts in the 
search to raise solutions to this problem.  
  The study and the Risk Analysis Tools comparative made present the beginning 
of the investigation that are developing the authors of the present article, leaving laid 
the way to investigate thorough the methodologies, tools, standards and principles to 
establish development models with practices and evaluations at the right moment to 
guarantee the quality, evaluating in first instance the security in the software 
development. Mainly the study to the practices raised by McGraw, shown in fig 1, 
for the security software development is left open. 
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